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INTRODUCTION 
 
Aoife Nolan, Rosa Freedman and Thérèse Murphy 
 
Described by Kofi Annan as the ‘jewel in the crown’1 of the United Nations human rights 
system, the Special Procedures (SP) system is a key element of the expanding international 
framework for human rights protection and promotion. Since the first mandate was created in 
1967,2 laying the foundations for the system that we have today, we have seen a significant 
evolution in the role and functions of SP: from a concentration on mass violations of human 
rights to a consideration of individual petitions; from a small number of country-focussed 
mandates to (as of 1 July 20163) 43 thematic mandates and 14 country ones; from being a minor 
and marginal part of the UN human rights framework to playing a crucial role in Human Rights 
Council and General Assembly sessions; from a mechanism of experts operating independently 
to one another to a coordinated system of mandate holders; from providing targeted reports on 
only very specific human rights issues to being a main source of information-sharing and 
reporting on a plethora of human rights threats across the globe; from operating largely under 
the radar to being the subject of significant state, civil society and academic expectations, 
resulting in harsh criticism when SP are regarded as having failed, or erred, in their work.4 
However, while there has been extensive scholarship in relation to other aspects of the 
UN human rights system – such as the work of the UN treaty-monitoring bodies, the Human 
Rights Council, and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)5 – 
                                                 
1 Kofi Annan referred to SP as ‘the crown jewel of the [human rights] system’ in a message to the 3rd Session of 
the Human Rights Council (HRC) on 29 November 2006: UN ‘Secretary-General, in Message to Human Rights 
Council, Cautions against Focusing on Middle East at expense of Darfur, Other Grave Crises’ (UN, 29 November 
2006) ˂www.un.org/press/en/2006/sgsm10769.doc.htm˃ accessed 30 July 2016. 
2 UN Economic and Social Council Res 1235 (XLII) (6 June 1967) UN Doc E/4393. 
3 A new Independent Expert on violence and discrimination against SOGI was created at the HRC 32nd Session 
in June 2016: UNHRC Res 32/2, ‘Protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity’ (30 June 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/32/2 (adopted as amended, by a recorded vote 23 to 18, 
with 6 abstentions).  
4 A recent example of this point is the volubly negative reaction on the part of state actors, civil society, academics 
and others to the 2016 decision of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) finding that Julian 
Assange was arbitrarily detained by the Governments of Sweden and the United Kingdom: WGAD ‘Opinion No. 
54/2015 concerning Julian Assange (Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)’ (22 
January 2016). A useful academic critique of the decision is provided in M Happold, ‘Julian Assange and the UN 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’ (EJIL: Talk!, 5 February 2016) ˂www.ejiltalk.org/julian-assange-and-
the-un-working-group-on-arbitrary-detention/˃ accessed 30 June 2016. 
5 Key recent and forthcoming examples of monographs and edited collections on these topics include: H 
Charlesworth and E Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism (CUP 
2015); R Freedman, The UN Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early Assessment (Routledge 2013); P Alston 
and F Megret (eds), The United Nations and Human Rights (2nd edn, OUP forthcoming 2016); H Keller and G 
Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (CUP 2012); BG Ramcharan, The Law, 
there has been relatively little academic attention paid to the SP system.6 Moreover, the limited 
scholarship that does address SP frequently focusses on specific mandates as part of broader 
work on a specific human right or country situation. As such, little assessment has been 
undertaken of the system as a whole, including with regard to mandate holders’ roles, functions, 
and the obstacles that they confront in their work. The lack of knowledge about the system 
impacts upon States, civil society, UN bodies and even mandate holders themselves.  
This lacuna is ever more problematic given the growing profile and effectiveness of the 
SP’s work, as well as the increasing attention and challenges that they face, both externally 
from States and internally from within the UN system. Given the current ‘state of play’ of the 
SP system, it is essential that careful attention and analysis be focussed on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the system. How does the SP system contribute to international human rights 
protection? How, when and why does it fail to do so? What steps can and should be taken to 
address shortcomings both within the system and in terms of the context in which it operates?   
Conscious of – and deeply concerned about – these unanswered questions, the editors 
organised a workshop held at the University of Nottingham Human Rights Law Centre on ‘The 
United Nations Special Procedures System’ that took place in late 2014. The discussions – 
sometimes strong disagreement – thrown up at that event served as the genesis of this volume 
which seeks to bring rigorous scholarly interrogation to bear on the Special Procedures.   
In developing the collection, we felt it vital that the volume reflect as broad a range of 
perspectives as possible, incorporating both key players within, and commentators on, the SP 
system. Contributors include current and former mandate holders and those who assist them in 
their work, members of UN human rights treaty bodies, academics and members of civil 
society. The collection thus combines insights from internal participants in and external 
observers of the system. Moreover, to ensure that the collection as a whole reflects the theory, 
the practice and the politics of the system, we have included a number of shorter reflective, 
policy-oriented pieces written from a practice perspective, which sit alongside the more 
                                                 
Policy and Politics of the UN Human Rights Council (Brill 2015); F Gaer and C Broecker (eds), The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Conscience for the World (Brill 2014).  
6 Existing works on the Special Procedures system include: M Lempinen, Challenges Facing the System of Special 
Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Åbo Akademi University 2001); I Nifosi, The 
UN Special Procedures in the Field of Human Rights (Intersentia 2005); E Domínguez-Redondo, Los 
procedimientos publicos especiales de la Comision de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas (Tirant lo Blanch 
2005); BG Ramcharan, The Protection Roles of UN Human Rights Special Procedures (Martinus Nijhoff 2009); 
Special Edition of International Journal of Human Rights on ‘The Role of the Special Rapporteurs of the United 
Nations Human Rights Council in the Development and Promotion of International Human Rights Norms’, 15(2) 
(2011); T Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the U.N.’s Independent Experts Promote Human Rights (Brookings 
Institution Press 2012). One notable recent addition is H Cantú Rivera (ed), The Special Procedures of the Human 
Rights Council (Intersentia 2015). 
conventional academic contributions. These shorter pieces by mandate holders and civil society 
members focus on specific aspects of their work within or in relation to the system, 
complementing the wider-ranging scholarly pieces. This variety of author perspectives and 
contribution types renders the collection well-placed to provide a holistic overview and 
comprehensive understanding of the SP system.  
In terms of structure, the book is divided into three parts, with the first being focussed 
on the Special Procedures system as a ‘system’. Here, contributors provide critical accounts of 
the Special Procedures’ history (Domínguez-Redondo), major institutional issues affecting 
mandate holders (Connors), the role and challenges of country visits (Gaer), the part played by 
the Coordination Committee in supporting and facilitating SP (M’jid), and the ongoing reforms 
aimed at strengthening cooperation between SP and States (Limon).  
The chapters in Part 2 focus on the actual work done by mandate holders, detailing the 
ways in which they have risen (or not) to the challenges and opportunities faced by them in the 
performance of their role(s). These range from advancing mandates in the face of trenchant 
state antagonism and non-cooperation (Shaheed and Parris Richter), to striking a balance 
between maintaining independence, ensuring state cooperation and fundraising work (Winkler 
and De Albuquerque), to developing working methods and internal rules and procedures where 
a SP is a collective body rather than an individual mandate holder (de Frouville), to SP taking 
advantage of the opportunities afforded by new information and communication technologies 
(McPherson and Probert). Other contributors to Part 2 focus on the role of mandate holders in 
developing international normative standards (Hohmann), in shaping, advancing (and 
sometimes hindering) the way in which changes occur in international human rights law 
(Davitti), and in addressing historic law and governance shortcomings in specific national 
contexts (Subedi). Part 2 closes with a consideration of the potential for using a mechanism 
that historically has been conceptualised in state-oriented terms to address the activities of 
powerful non-state actors (Hunt). 
Part 3 moves on to locate the Special Procedures within a number of broader contexts. 
Evans’ chapter is focussed on the role of SP within the wider UN architecture on torture. Fisher 
and Beswick address the international and the African regional SP systems, interrogating state 
engagement with both. Freedman and Crépeau consider the changing nature of the relationship 
between some Global North States and the SP system, while the central concern of Lynch’s 
contribution is rooted in the dangerous reality of state intimidation or reprisal faced by many 
human rights defenders seeking to engage with the Special Procedures. 
Ultimately, the collection makes clear that there is much to praise about the system: SP 
have played a crucial role in providing material facts, reports and recommendations in 
monitoring and protecting human rights. Mandate holders have responded to the political, legal 
and resource-related contexts in which they operate by adopting a range of innovative working 
methods that have resulted in SP work having greater traction.7 The reports and other work 
produced by mandate holders have served as important landmarks in international human rights 
law norm-setting.8 SP have played a central part in identifying key rights-related issues and 
best practices.9 There have also been many steps forward in relation to the coherence of SP as 
a system, and to the harmonisation and coherence of working practices and streamlined 
methods for human rights protection and promotion.10 In recent years we have seen that ever 
more States and civil society actors have sought to strengthen SP, working together to ensure 
that this ‘crown jewel’ is preserved, polished and foregrounded within the UN human rights 
system.11 Indeed, despite its disjointed, uneven development in sometimes-hostile soil, despite 
its frequently cited shortcomings, and despite the attacks posed at different times from different 
quarters,12 the collection demonstrates that there is unquestionably a clearly defined and 
strongly established system of Special Procedures that has a set place and plays a key role in 
terms of the international human rights law architecture.  
However, it is also evident from the collection that the ad hoc development of the SP 
system has given rise to significant problems in terms of the conceptualisation and effective 
functioning of the system. While some challenges have been overcome, many remain. In some 
ways, the system is a victim of its own success: at a logistical level, the proliferation of 
mandates – resulting in creation of mandates that are sometimes vague13 and overlapping14 – 
has put significant pressure on resources and the capacity of the OHCHR to provide the support 
needed by mandate holders, threatening the effectiveness and efficiency of the system as a 
whole.15  
                                                 
7 For more on this point, see the contributions of de Frouville, Winkler and De Albuquerque, McPherson and 
Probert, Hunt, and Subedi. 
8 For more on this point, see the contributions of Hohmann and Davitti.  
9 For more on the point of the role of mandate holders in identifying best practices, see the contributions of 
Shaheed and Parris Richter, and Winkler and De Albuquerque. 
10 For more on this point, see the contributions of Domínguez-Redondo and Connors.  
11 For more on this point, see the contributions of Limon, and Winkler and De Albuquerque. 
12 For more on this point, see the contributions of Gaer, Shaheed and Parris Richter, and Freedman and Crépeau.  
13 One often-cited example is the Independent Expert on Human Rights and International Solidarity established 
by UNCHR Res 2005/55 (20 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/55. 
14 See eg the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and the Special 
Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.  
15 For more on this point, see in particular the contributions of Connors, Winker and De Albuquerque, and Shaheed 
and Parris Richter. 
Other challenges relate to the structure of the SP system as it stands. As regards 
composition, concern remains about regional and gender representation in terms of SP mandate 
holders.16 And, as is evident from the collection, the system itself is non-uniform in terms of 
both the form and function of SP, with only limited provision for ‘joined-up action’ between 
mandate holders.17 There is only one annual meeting of SP per year, and March 2015 was the 
first time that the Coordination Committee of the Special Procedures presented an annual report 
to the Human Rights Council on the activities of the SP system as a whole.18 More broadly, 
relatively little is understood about SP outside the system, with even new mandate holders 
frequently having no knowledge of or exposure to the system prior to appointment. With regard 
to SP interplay with other parts of the UN system, SP coordination with other UN human rights 
entities such as treaty-monitoring bodies has not always been consistent and there is a clear 
need for greater cooperation between specific SP, OHCHR and other UN agencies.19  
The chapters build on and develop the ever more extensive debate amongst States, 
academics, UN agencies and mandate holders themselves about the appropriate parameters of 
the role of SP. While the legitimacy of the system, which relies on States’ consent, rests on its 
universal application, state-driven political processes are central to the way the system operates 
in practice.20 Indeed the part played by States – in creating, terminating and providing support 
to mandates, in engaging and cooperating (or not) with SP – has resulted in concerns about the 
politicisation of the system, not least because of recent efforts to control the independence of 
mandate holders through mechanisms such as the Code of Conduct, introduced in 2007, and 
appointments processes. Put differently, while the stature of the SP has increased, so too has 
state push-back.21 But so too has the capacity of SP to temper and resist state efforts to shackle 
their independence; for instance, while the Code of Conduct undoubtedly fetters SP in a range 
of ways, mandate holders were able to lobby effectively (with civil society allies) to fend off 
                                                 
16 M Limon and T Piccone, ‘Human Rights Special Procedures: Determinants of Influence. Understanding and 
Strengthening the Effectiveness of the UN’s Independent Human Rights Experts’ (Universal Rights Group, March 
2014) 35 ˂www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/03/19-un-human-rights-experts-evaluation-
piccone/un-human-rights-experts-evaluation-piccone.pdf˃ accessed 25 April 2015. 
17 For more on this point of joined-up action, see the contributions of M’jid, and Winkler and De Albuquerque. 
18 OHCHR ‘François Crépeau, the Chairperson of the Coordination Committee, presents the annual report of 
special procedures to the Council’ (OHCHR, 18 March 2015) 
˂www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15801&LangID=E˃ accessed 25 April 
2015. 
19 For more on these points, see the contributions of Evans, M’jid, Connors, and Winkler and De Albuquerque.  
20 For more on this point, see in particular the contributions of Domínguez-Redondo, and Freedman and Crépeau. 
21 For an account of such state push-back, see P Alston, ‘Hobbling the Monitors: Should U.N. Human Rights 
Monitors be Accountable?’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 561. For more on this point, see in 
particular the contributions of Shaheed and Parris Richter, Limon, and Freedman and Crépeau.   
an earlier draft that would have constrained SP far more severely than the Code that was 
ultimately adopted.22 
This volume does not pretend to answer all the questions arising in relation to the SP 
system – the claim that any one book could do so is unsustainable. It does, however, provide 
comprehensive coverage and analysis of most, if not all, key aspects of that system. The 
conclusions in it will feed into reform proposals that will strengthen the SP system, including 
mainstreaming the work of mandate holders within the UN human rights system and 
throughout the UN Organisation as a whole as well as protecting the independence of those 
experts and ensuring that countries are not able to undermine Special Procedures.23 
Contributions also make clear the ongoing challenges faced by mandate holders, identifying 
areas that must be strengthened to ensure that the roles, functions and work of SP are not 
blocked by States. Moreover, the collection demonstrates the fundamental part that external 
actors such as the Human Rights Council and OHCHR must play to ensure that attacks on the 
system do not succeed.  
And serious threats clearly remain. Since 2014 it has become clear that States are 
becoming increasingly aware of the key role played by SP. This has been evidenced not only 
by their engagements with mandate holders but also in terms of efforts to block new mandates 
being created or to prevent specific individuals being appointed to mandates. March 2014 saw 
some States at the Human Rights Council block the list of new mandate holders presented by 
the Council President.24 That occurred ostensibly due to disagreement about the suitability of 
some individuals proposed for mandates (particularly in the context of Occupied Palestinian 
Territories mandate)25 and stated concerns about the regional and gender balance of 
appointees.26 However, according to many insiders although not formally documented, the 
blocking was at least in part attributable to the fact that some States were displeased by the 
Council’s failure to appoint their nationals to mandates. More recently, during the June 2016 
                                                 
22 For an account of the negotiations around the code of conduct highlighting the role of SP in this context, see 
Alston (n 21) 588–95. For further discussion of the Code of Conduct, see E Domínguez-Redondo, ‘Rethinking the 
Legal Foundations of Control in International Human Rights Law: The case of Special Procedures’ (2011) 29 NQHR 
261.    
23 For more on these points, see the contributions of Connors and Limon to this collection. See also Limon and 
Piccone (n 16). 
24 This resulted in postponement of the approval of that list being required: UNHRC ‘Report of the Human Rights 
Council on its twenty-fifth session’ (17 July 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/25/2, paras 60–62.  
25 For more on this point, see R Freedman, ‘Reform of selection process needed to strengthen Special Procedures’ 
(International Service for Human Rights, 20 May 2016) ˂www.ishr.ch/news/reform-selection-process-needed-
strengthen-special-procedures˃ accessed 30 July 2016. The eventual appointee to that mandate, Makarim 
Wibinsono, was a candidate who had not been on the original shortlist at the March 2014 session. 
26 H Power, ‘Special Procedures mandate-holders: The new intake (Universal Rights Group, 9 May 2014) 
˂www.universal-rights.org/blog/special-procedure-mandate-holders-the-new-intake/˃ accessed 30 July 2016. 
session of the Human Rights Council, many States first sought to block the creation of a new 
mandate on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity minorities,27 followed the next day by 
Russia attempting to block the list of proposed mandate holders,28 forcing the day’s session to 
run late into the night and be carried over to an additional date one week later. These incidents 
are not simply reflective of state discomfort with specific human rights issues and/or 
individuals. Rather, they show that States are increasingly aware of the central role that Special 
Procedures play in the international human rights system, and that mandate holders’ work can 
have significant impact. 
Ultimately, any future efforts to defend, strengthen and reform the SP system so as to 
advance the effective promotion and protection of human rights will only be effective if based 
on an accurate understanding of Special Procedures, their work and functions, and the system’s 
strengths, weaknesses, and challenges. It is the editors’ hope and belief that this collection will 
provide the necessary tools to those seeking to carry out this vital work. 
 
The information in the collection reflects the state of play on 1 June 2015, unless otherwise 
specified by chapter authors. 
                                                 
27 For more on this point, see ‘An L.G.B.T. Watchdog at the United Nations’ (New York Times, 1 July 2016) 
˂http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/opinion/an-lgbt-watchdog-at-the-united-
nations.html?ref=opinion&referer=https://t.co/GSGlfKOKwy&_r=0˃ accessed 30 July 2016. 
28 Universal Rights Group, ‘Report on the 32nd Session of the Human Rights Council’ (URG, 11 July 2016) 
˂www.universal-rights.org/urg-human-rights-council-reports/report-32nd-session-human-rights-council/˃ 
accessed 30 July 2016.  
